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MINUTES
UTAH SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Wednesday, September 23,2009
Administrative Office of the Courts
Francis M. Wikstrom, Presiding
PRESENT:

Francis M. Wikstrom, Trystan B. Smith, Francis J. Carney, Barbara L. Townsend,
Honorable Reuben J. Renstrom, Leslie W. Slaugh, Terrie T. Mcintosh, David W.
Scofield, Lori Woffinden, Honorable Derrek P. Pullan, Honorable Lyle R.
Anderson, Jonathan O. Hafen, Steven Marsden, James T. Blanch, Lincoln L.
Davies, Todd M. Shaughnessy, W. Cullen Battle

ABSENT:

Thomas R. Lee, Judge David O. Nuffer, Judge Anthony B. Quinn, Anthony W.
Scofield, Janet H. Smith

STAFF:

Timothy M. Shea, Sammi V, Anderson

GUESTS:

Angela Fonnesbeck (Family Law Section), Stewart Ralphs (Family Law Section)
Ms. Fonnesbeck and Mr. Ralphs attended the meeting to discuss a potential rule
requiring basic financial disclosures at the outset of family law cases.
Tom Brunker (AG's Office), Rick Schwermer (AOC), Kirk Torgensen (AG's
Office), Mark Fields (AOC)
Mr. Brunker, Mr. Schwermer, Mr. Torgensen and Mr. Fields attended the meeting
to discuss proposed changes to Rule 65C (Post-Conviction Reviews in Capital
Cases).

I.

APPROVAL OF MINUTES.

Mr. Wikstrom called the meeting to order at 4:00 p.m., and entertained comments from
the committee concerning the June 24,2009 minutes. No comments were made and Mr.
Wikstrom asked for a motion that the minutes be approved. The motion was duly made and
seconded, and unanimously approved.
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IL

INTRODUCTION OF NEW MEMBERS AND SAMMI ANDERSON.

Mr. Wikstrom introduced Judge Reuben Renstrom and Trystan Smith as new members of
the committee. The new members made the appropriate disclosures as required by the Supreme
Court Rules. Mr. Wikstrom also introduced Sammi Anderson as the new secretary for the
committee.
IH.

RULE 108. DISCLOSURES IN DOMESTIC RELATIONS PROCEEDINGS.

Ms. Fonnesbeck, current chair of the Family Law Section, and Mr. Stewart Ralphs
represented the Family Law Section in a discussion regarding the need for basic initial
disclosures in domestic proceedings. Proposed Rule 108 is the product of discussion and
commentfromthe Family Law Section over the course of the last 18 months.
Ms. Fonnesbeck and Mr. Ralphs emphasized the prevalence of pro se litigants and
mandatory mediation in domestic proceedings. They expressed the view that basic mandatory
disclosures regarding income and assets would facilitate early resolution of many domestic
cases.
Mr. Slaugh and Mr. Scofield noted that disclosures regarding one party's ownership
interest in a business entity require special treatment so that the interest of the entity in
safeguarding confidential business information is also protected. Mr. Slaugh proposed
compromise language based on whether the party to the proceeding has control over the entity.
Mr. Wikstrom asked that any language changes be sent to Tim Shea. Mr. Shea suggested the
Rule be called Rule 26(a) rather than Rule 108.
IV.

RULE 65C. POST-CONVICTION REVIEWS IN CAPITAL CASES.

Mr. Wikstrom introduced the proposed amendment to Rule 65C governing postconviction relief. Reference was made to a September 14,2009 letter to the committee from
Representative Kay L. Mclff. Mr. Wikstrom discussed efforts, led by the Attorney General's
office, to amend the Utah State Constitution to provide that post-conviction remedies be
governed by statute, notwithstanding any other law. It was ultimately decided that an
amendment to Rule 65C, in conjunction with statutory amendments to the Post-Conviction
Remedies Act ("PCRA"), would be a more prudent alternative. The proposed amendment is the
compromise effort of an informal task force including members of the Attorney General's office,
the defense bar, Representative Mclff, academics, representativesfromthe Administrative Office
of the Courts and Mr. Wikstrom as Chair of the committee.
Mr, Wikstrom reported that the compromise in the proposed amendment has been
approved by the Attorney General's office and participating defense counsel. Mr. Slaugh
questioned the necessity of a sentence in subparagraph (a) to summarize the PCRA. Mr. Brunker
from the Attorney General's office responded the language is included to ensure this area of law
is governed by statute, the PCRA, not older common law.
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Ihe committee first discussed depositions. Mr. Slaugh expressed the view that many
eases require fewer depositions than are taken and approved of the concept that depositions be
limited by nuniber of hours, rather than by number of separate depositions. Mr. Hafen expressed.
caution in setting the deposition hour limit too low and emphasized the need to let lawyers
handle their cases efficiently and as they see fit. Mr. Hafen advocated to allow the parties and
lawyers decide how to divide up the total number of deposition hours, with the caveat that party
depositions are limited to 7 hours and non-party depositions to 4 hours. The committee was
unanimous that each side should have 20 hours for depositions, to be divided up as the sides so
choose, with party depositions limited to 7 hours and non-partv depositions limited to 4 hours.
* ^
.
|
Discussion tol i t as to the
.'icumcji" * \-iUi- -^.K.i^Ln^
A ; . U ; , U tney siiould be prohibited. Mr. Slaugh
d that contention interrogatories are useful to flesh out affirmative defenses identified by
the oiher ^ide Mr. Hafen suggested limiting interrogatories t<* 1 .> per side and allowing parties
to use those interrogatories as contention interrogatories if they are so inclined. Mr. Shea
emphasized that the default limits proposed by the committee are not binding. If the parties and
lawyers believe they require additional discovery, and if the budget for that discovery has been
presented to and approved by the parties, the court should permit discovery beyond the default
limits. The committee was unanimous that each side should get ! 5 interrogatories, to be used as
contention interrogatories or otherwise.
The committee then considered requests for production "K Is. 1 0"w nsend expressed a
desire to maintain consistency. Mr. Wikstrom responded there is currently no limit on requests
for production. The committee discussed various proposed limits and concerns associated with
drafting and interpreting requests for production too narrowly or too broadly. Mr. Scofield
expressed a concern regarding whether responsive documents must be identified as responsive to
particular requests for production. Mr. Smith discussed concern regarding h o w requests for
production would be divided among multiple parties on the same side. Judge Anderson noted
the court's role in determining whether parties "on the same side* are sufficiently aov: rse thai
they warrant separate discovery limits. The committee decided that each side should I :ivc 7
requests for production. The committee declined to add any language as to requiring mat
responsive documents be made to correspond with particular requests for production
I "he committee next turned to requests for admission. Mr. Slaugh indicated requests for
admission are useful for authenticating documents and Judge Anderson noted his observation
that requests for admission are used effectively in collections cases. Mr. Hafen suggested a limit
of 25. I he committee unanimously approved a limit of 25 requests for admission per side.
Mr. Wikstrom then introduced the topic of timing for the requisite disclosures Mr. Shea
suggested that Plaintiff be required to make the requisite disclosures 14 days after Defendant
files an Answer. The committee approved this suggestion. Mr. Shea discussed keying the
deadline for Defendant's disclosures to Plaintiffs disclosures. The committee agreed,
Defendant's disclosures will be due 28 days after Plaintiff's disclosures are made. Ms
Townsend raised the issue as to what will happen when multiple defendants are served at
different times. Judge Anderson was not troubled by this as later served defendants always have
these kinds of issues to address. Mr. Wikstrom proposed that Defendant's disclosures be due 28
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later. Fhe committee agreed.
Judge M a n inquired as t o whether Plaintiff would >uffer a penalty if Plaintiff failed to
make disclosures within 14 days The committee discussed several options, including d i s m i s s !
without prejudice, Rule 37 sanctions, allowing a motion to dismiss by Defendant, etc. Mr.
Wikstrom and Mr. Marsden proposed that n o party be permitted to take additional discovery
until after their own disclosures filed. The committee approved this suggestion.
! he commit!-, the n discussed what would happen once the parties'* requisite disclosures
are made. Mr. Wikstrom i ais I the possibility of requiring attorneys to meet and confer to agree
on additional discover) ' 'I h = • :• : in in titt $ s- 2: ::]:: 1 • ssed concerns that attorneys d o n ' t generally meet
and confer. Mr. Haft nsi igg 1 st : • i th* .tth =
:: • :! : fz ;i lit 2 .ssumption be that the matter is trial ready and
no additional discovery is needed unless parties stipulate otherwise or one part}' req K ^
additional discovery. The committee agreed, "'"l! I: $• : nt st ilahon or motion ibr additiona
!
discovery, courts should expect a pre-trial order at 1 :1 s :r
e. The committee agreed that
150 days after first Defendant's disclosures, fact dis : ::
mourned closed absent
stipulation or request for additional discovery, A pie tK~* v ^ , ^ w.wv ««J trial date can be
initiated by the court or on request of the parties,
Significant discussion regarding the scope vi u> ,, •
. uage i'u. emphasized access to justice, especially for smaller
a need to v ';
IK.
judiciary on the proportionality of cases, fe, amount in controversy vis a vis costs o;
rry,
so that courts are more willing to cut discovers off in low value cases. Multiple committee
members expressed their opinion that the scope of discovery issue v\ ill depend entireK on
courts' willingness to enforce the restrictions.
Mr. Wikstrom then .asked what role Rule 35 examinations should have in the i nitial
phase of discovery. Mr. Carney addressed the different perspectives held by the plaintiff and
defense bars. Mr. Smith discussed the significant costs associated with the examination. Judge
Pullan suggested that once fact discovery is closed, judges be involved in a proportionality
review before expert discovery, including the Rule 35 examination, is undertaken. The
committee further discussed whether Rule 35 should be revised to treat the independent medical
examination just as other experts are treated Mr. Carney expressed his opinion thai independen:
medical examinations are treated differently by the rules onl> because they evolved at J titr
when expert, practice other than independent medical examimMoi wis n-»i evtensivc\ It* Wikstrom emphasized that the first two phases, requisite disclosures am*, i.irgeto discovery, are confined to fact discovery. The committee turned to expert discover) Mi
Carney suggested that the party bearing the burden of proof have ~»0 days after the do «.- 01
discovery to submit expert report(s). Rebuttal reports will be due 30 da\ s later. The * onum • =..
agreed. The committee further agreed that there be no expert depositions and that experts not be
permitted to exceed the scope of their reports at trial.
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Mr. Wikstrom noted KcprcM/niati\e Mcitf ^ di -^c
.<:.
-c undefined, limited
area where the Court reserves the i ight to exercise its discretion m mis area. Judge Pullan
(,uo-.!..»ned representatives from the Attorney General's office whether the Attorney General is
takn ; . the position that Courts have no common law authority to set aside a conviction. Ju^*,
Pullan sought assurances that the Court's discretion to act in egregious circumstance is
preserved under the proposed amendment Mr. Brunker and Mr. Torgeson assured Judge Pullan
that it was not the intention of the Attorney General to foreclose the Court from granting relief
outside the PCRA in appropriate circumstances. Judge Pullan emphasized his view Inat the
courts must have the ability to correct egregious injustices through the writ process and indicated
his support for the proposed amendment only so long as that ability is preserved to the judiciary.
Judge Pullan was assured by those representative^ nf thr Attorney General's office present that
courts would retain that ability,
Mr. Slaugh moved the approval of the amendment. \ \ Battle seconded. The motiui*
was unanimously approved. Publication will happen on an expedited basis.
'i ' I I \ l • ACTION ON R U L E S 5b,
' • •• I RACT O F J* » « ; V H A ' II II I" I ' Il 11 II
rDGE AS A M A . . ~ i . U l Aii^ ** * ,.

\ •• .

* i; ^ i.
J, oI these proposed amendments have been published for
! 4
• • MI f :
' to clarify existing language and the process for
cu ^ an
^
Vfc Woffinden whether there was any need
IO have the abstract attested under oath, Ms. W J)
indicated there is no need, that the Clerk
can sign under seai of the court The committee unanimoush approved the amendment to the
Rule with the change to allow the Clerk to sign under the sei<1 of ?»ic court.
As for Rule 63A, the Committee considered LOinmenb uia: the Rule :>iiouiu ,*j r i
part\ actions. Mr. Shea and Mr, Wikstrom explained that the amendment is intended io L , (
that parties in one-action proceedings, such as probate matters or adoptions, are not permitted to
unilaterally change judges as a matter of right. The amendment is intended to eliminate the
possibility of judge shopping in one-party actions. The Committee approved the proposed
amendment as written notwithstanding the comment.
SIMPLIFIED CIVIT P R O C E D U R E S .
vii Wtkstiom introduced wu topic ana expressed a ui MM 'hai UK. commitiei. icadconsensus on a cogent, non-final set of proposed rules as the foundation for future discussion:.
As an overview, the point of the simplified procedures is to lias e significant disclosure at the
outset. Mr. Wikstrom expressed his belief that many cases would be trial-read) just upon the
basis of initial disclosures, and without need of follow-up discovery, If not, the panic, would
meet and try to agree on a discovery plan. Lawyers would be charged with preparing nd
presenting to their clients a proposed budget for discovery, and with obtaining client a'»pro\ ai lor
that budget. If the parties agree on (lie discovery schedule, the court shall approve, u he parties
cannot agree, they would go to the court to set a discovery plan and schedule :OJL , I Milan and
Judge Anderson expressed the view that it is best for the ennr? to have the benefit ol tKe earh
disclosures for purposes of this conference.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Mr. Shea raised the is^n ni e.Nemp'j.--.*- irom Kuie jo(a; disclosures. I he cr~imittee
agreed that the exemption for piu ae litigant- and amounts in controvers\ under $20,000 mu<\ he
abolished, Mr. Shea raised the possibility of limiting subpoenas duces tecum. Th- e 'mmiiu\j
declined to impose any limit in this regard. Mr. Shea then raised the issue ol clectr > v ally
stored information and queried whether the rules should require a meeting to discu> -.
preservation of this information. Mr. Wikstrom suggested that it one party believes the other
party should be obligated to preserve evidence, that the onus is on the party believing electronic
evidence exists to notify the other side. Mr. Shaughnessy suggested that the rule state that
parties are under no obligation to alter existing document storage/destruction policies unless and
until notified by the other side. The committee decided that, after a complaint is filed, if one
party wants to preserve electronic evidence, that party must seek a meeting and try to reach an
agreement as to scope of preservation. If the parties are unable to agree, that party can file a
motion for preservation with the court.
Mi-NT.
The meeting adjourned a! S:00 \:.-„i. . IK OUutxr ;iu : . s .
meeting will t I .;ild at 4:00 p.m. on Wednesday, Novembei io, zuuy
Office of the Courts,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i ,

\»

AcWe^cAwv

"V??

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 1

|j) LexisNexis*
3 of 90 DOCUMENTS

©
Analysis
As of: Mar 29,2012
MISSOURI, PETITIONER v. GALIN E. FRYE
i
No. 10-444
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2012 U.S. LEXIS 2321
October 31,2011, Argued
March 21,2012, Decided
NOTICE:
The LEXIS pagination of this document is subject to
change pending release of the final published version.
PRIOR HISTORY: [*1]
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS OF MISSOURI, WESTERN DISTRICT.
Frye v. State, 311 S W.3d350, 2010 Mo. App. LEXIS 353
(Mo. Ct App., 2010)
DISPOSITION:

Vacated and remanded.

CASE SUMMARY:

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Respondent, who pleaded
guilty to driving with a revoked license, filed a
postconviction relief petition alleging that his counsel's
failure to inform him of a plea offer denied him Sixth
Amendment effective assistance of counsel. A state court
denied the postconviction relief petition, but the Missouri
Court of Appeals reversed. Petitioner, the State of Missouri, sought review. The U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
OVERVIEW: After being charged with driving with a
revoked license, the prosecutor sent respondent's counsel
two plea bargains. Respondent's counsel did not advise
him of the offers, which-expired. Prior to the preliminary
hearing, respondent was again arrested for driving with a

revoked license. He pleaded guilty without an agreement.
On review, the Court reaffirmed that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance applied to the entry of a
guilty plea. The Court further held that defense counsel
had a duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that
might be favorable to an accused; when counsel allowed
the offer to expire without advising respondent or allowing him to consider it, counsel did not render constitutionally effective assistance. However, under Strickland,
respondent had to show prejudice from the ineffective
assistance. The Court concluded that the state appellate
court erred by not requiring respondent to show not only
a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the
lapsed plea, but also a reasonable probability that the
prosecution would have adhered to the plea and that the
trial court would have accepted it.
OUTCOME: In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Missouri Court of Appeals and
remanded the case for further proceedings. 1 dissent.
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental
Rights > Criminal Process > Assistance of Counsel
Criminal Law & Procedure > Counsel > Effective Assistance > General Overview
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Analysis
As of: Mar 29, 2012
BLAINE LAFLER, PETITIONER v. ANTHONY COOPER
i

No. 10-209
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
4

2012 U.S. LEXIS 2322
October 31,2011, Argued
March 21,2012, Decided
NOTICE:
The LEXIS pagination of this document is subject to
change pending release of the final published version.
PRIOR HISTORY: [*1]
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.
Cooper v. Lqfler, 376 Fed. Appx. 563, 2010 U.S. App.
LEXIS 9589 (6th Cir.) (6th Cir. Mich., 2010)
DISPOSITION:

Vacated and Remanded.

CASE SUMMARY:

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Respondent state prison
inmate rejected a plea bargain based on erroneous legal
advice of counsel and was convicted at trial of all offenses and received a much greater sentence than offered
in the plea bargain. Upon the grant of a writ of certiorari,
petitioner prison warden appealed the judgment of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit which upheld
a grant of a writ of habeas corpus based on ineffective
assistance of counsel.
OVERVIEW: It was conceded that the inmate's counsel
was deficient in providing erroneous legal advice concerning the plea bargain, but the warden contended that
the inmate sufferedpb prejudice because the inmate was
properly convicted after a fair trial. The U.S. Supreme

Court held that the inmate's fair trial did not preclude
prejudice from counsel's ineffective assistance. The right
to effective assistance of counsel was not solely to ensure
a fair trial, and there was no indication that the fair trial
cured counsel's error. Further, the inmate suffered prejudice rather than a windfall based on the likelihood that
the outcome would have been different, since the inmate
sought relief based on a failure to meet a valid legal
standard rather than application of an incorrect legal
principle. Also, a lack of prejudice could not be based on
the reliability of the trial since the reliability of the pretrial bargaining, which caused the inmate to lose the
benefits of the bargain, was the concern at issue. However, the appropriate remedy for counsel's error was to
re-offer the plea bargain and conduct further proceedings
in state court, rather than directing that the plea bargain
be enforced.
OUTCOME: The judgment upholding the grant of the
writ of habeas corpus and directing that the plea bargain
be enforced was vacated, and the case was remanded for
remedial action. 5-4 Decision; 2 Dissents.
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental
Rights > Criminal Process > Assistance of Counsel
Criminal Law ^Procedure > Counsel > Effective Assistance > Pleas
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